INTRODUCTION
1. On 26
November 1996, the Government of Colombia and the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) agreed on the establishment of an office in
Colombia of OHCHR, which opened in April 1997. Its mandate is to assist the
Colombian authorities in developing policies and programmes to promote and
protect human rights, to advise civil society on matters of human rights, to
observe the situation of human rights and international humanitarian law in the
context of the violence and the internal armed conflict, and to submit its
reports and analyses to the High Commissioner.
2. The High Commissioner
visited Colombia from 7 to 9
September 2007 to sign an agreement with the Government of Colombia to extend
the office in Colombia’s
mandate in its entirety up to 30
October 2010. After 10 years of activities, the High Commissioner wishes to
express her acknowledgement to the Colombian people and to the authorities for
having welcomed and cooperated with the Office. The High Commissioner also
extends her gratitude to those countries and organizations which have given
support to the office in Colombia,
and contributed to the promotion and protection of human rights.
3. This report covers the
period from January to December 2007, focusing on the most significant aspects
of the office in Colombia’s
mandate. It is based on the following activities: systematic and analytical
observations of the human rights situation, including field visits, the
processing of complaints, the analysis of reports and statistics, interviews
with State authorities, victims, other representatives of civil society, United
Nations agencies in Colombia,
bodies from the international community and NGOs.
I. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
4. Colombia has been seriously
affected by an internal armed conflict for more than 40 years. It has also
become increasingly evident that the illegal armed groups are directly or
indirectly involved in drug-trafficking, and are associated with
local and international networks of organized crime and corruption. The complex
relationships between all these factors, added to persistent structural
problems such as impunity and limitations of access to justice, inequality and
discrimination, continue to affect the human rights situation negatively. That
said, it must be recognized that Colombia has made progress in
restoring security throughout the country in recent years, and the visibility given
to human rights in the public agenda is a solid achievement.
5. During 2007, the most
relevant political and security-related events with an impact on the human
rights situation were: (a) the judicial proceedings against demobilized
paramilitary leaders under Law 975/2005, known as the “Justice and Peace Law”; (b) judicial
investigations into the activities of a number of high-level public servants
for their alleged links with paramilitary groups; (c) the emergence or
consolidation of a range of new illegal armed groups following the paramilitary
demobilization process, some of them having strong links with organized crime
and drug-trafficking; and (d) the holding of regional and local elections.
6. The security forces
continued to implement “el plan de guerra” (war plan) against illegal armed
groups, in particular against the guerrillas, through the “Plan Consolidación”,
which replaced the former “Plan Patriota”. The intensity of hostilities
frequently had a negative impact on the civilian population, and breaches of international
humanitarian law were attributed to all armed actors. Several new illegal armed
groups emerged, building up strength and engaging in
violent acts in certain regions. FARC-EP and ELN persisted in their violent
disruptions of public order and continued to infringe international
humanitarian law. A number of organizations – including the Organization of
American States’ Mission to Support the Peace
Process in Colombia
(MAPP/OEA) – raised the alert on guerrilla activities in specific areas,
formerly under demobilized paramilitary groups’ control. According to the security
forces, there was an increase in militia-type activities by the guerrillas as
they retreated from the regular forces´ offensives. These dynamics are more
directly observed in the south of the Department of Córdoba, in the Urabá-Chocó
area, eastern Antioquia, the north of Santander,
the north of Tolima, Nariño, Putumayo, Guaviare, Vichada and Arauca.
7. The Government authorized
and sponsored a number of initiatives of its own and of third parties, to
make contact with FARC-EP, with varying degrees of support. Its intention was
to find agreements which would lead to the release of hostages in exchange for
imprisoned guerrillas and, perhaps, eventually lead to peace talks. There was
enormous consternation when the 11 deputies from the Departmental Assembly of
Valle del Cauca had been murdered, after being held by
FARC-EP since 2002. Their death was met with a unanimous outcry by Colombians,
leading to massive protests, and a widespread movement of public opinion urging
the release of all the kidnap victims. A mixture of shock and grief also shook
the nation with the publication of pictures of the hostages and letters written
by them to their families, seized by the authorities from FARC-EP agents in
late November, which showed their deplorable situation. All of this reminded
people at home and abroad that those who fall into the hands of illegal armed
groups remain permanently defenceless and vulnerable. Some of them have already
been held for as long as 10 years.
8. On 28 October 2007 elections
were held nationwide for regional and local authorities. Governors and members
of local assemblies were elected in the 32 departments, mayors and councillors
in 1,094 municipalities, four metropolitan districts, and for local wards.
Candidates were nominated from a broad range of political groups. The voter turnout was
high and the results confirmed the country’s political plurality. The
mobilization of the forces of law and order contributed to security at the
polls. During the polling day, a climate of normality prevailed. However,
before and after that day, there were isolated acts of violence. There were death threats
and even murders in some places, mainly by guerrilla groups (especially
FARC-EP), although some were attributed to members of the new illegal armed
groups, drug-traffickers and criminal gangs who threatened the lives of
numerous candidates and restricted their political activities. A total of eight aspiring
candidates and 23 registered candidates were murdered; four aspiring candidates
and five registered candidates were kidnapped.
9. Another important aspect
of the political context was the continuation of the dialogue among the Government,
civil society and the international community, which led to the III International Congress on Colombia,
held in Bogotá in November 2007. The final declaration reaffirmed the need to
continue with efforts to achieve results [in applying the recommendations of
the High Commissioner] as quickly as possible.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW SITUATION
10. Although there are some
encouraging signs of improvement, the situation of human rights and international
humanitarian law remains a matter of concern, particularly in regions in which
the dynamics of internal armed conflict have become more intense.
11. The authorities, especially
the Government, welcomed the High Commissioner’s recommendations and
cooperation in general, renewing their commitment to full implementation, while
acknowledging that there are still challenges to be faced and shortcomings to
be remedied. However, major efforts and additional measures must be sustained
and reinforced over a long period of time if they are to be really effective.
This should include coordinated and convergent actions by all sectors and
institutions of the State and civil society. Specific efforts must be made to
prevent victims’ demands from becoming
invisible and thus irrelevant. The fulfilment of the rights of victims of the
armed conflict to truth, justice, and reparation, and the guarantee of
non-repetition, are essential conditions for a transition towards lasting peace
and national reconciliation.
A. State authorities
1.
The fight against impunity
12. Structural problems persist
in the administration of justice. These include the under-reporting of crimes
to the authorities, the difficulties of access to the judicial system, the
insufficiency of funds and technological resources (despite increased budgets),
the lack of uniform criteria in the application of the law, the high workload
of judges and prosecutors, the slow pace of proceedings, and cases of
corruption. During 2007 some progress was made in opening up channels to combat
impunity, particularly in judicial proceedings under Law 975/2005 against
demobilized paramilitary leaders whose depositions represent a first step in
clarifying past events. Investigations have also been undertaken by
the Supreme Court and the Attorney General´s Office against high-level civilian
and military officials for alleged links with paramilitary groups and
corruption.
13. Investigations into the
storming of the Palace
of Justice by the M-19
guerrilla group and its recovery by the army in 1986, and others related to the
murders of members of the Unión
Patriotica were reopened. The courts also handed down decisions against
members of the security forces who perpetrated extrajudicial executions, as in
the cases of the three trade unionists murdered in August 2004 at Caño Seco in
Saravena, Arauca, and the farmer murdered in April 2004 in the village of La Hondita
in El Peñol, Antioquia. In both cases the military patrols reported that the
victims had been “shot in combat”, and the courts found that they were not. The
Attorney General´s Office also ordered the detention of an army captain for the
massacre of five adults and three children in San José de Apartadó, Antioquia,
in February 2005.
14. At the international level,
the Inter-American Court
on Human Rights has ruled against the Colombian
State, which accepted responsibility
for the extrajudicial execution of an indigenous leader in the Nasa community, Cauca, by members of the armed forces in February 1988. In another case in
which the State has also accepted responsibility, the same Court found that
paramilitaries, with the collaboration of State agents, were guilty of the
massacre of 12 officers of the judiciary in January 1989 in La
Rochela, Santander.
(a) Investigations
into links between public officials and private enterprise with paramilitary
groups
15. The Supreme Court of
Justice opened investigations into the activities of 45 members of Congress for
their alleged links with paramilitary groups. The accused are from 16 different
departments; 18 of them have been imprisoned. Others under investigation
include four former departmental governors and 18 former mayors. In November, the
Procurator General dismissed the Director of the Administrative Department of
Security (DAS) and barred him from holding public office for 18 years, for
having collaborated with paramilitary groups and taken part in acts of
corruption. All of these investigations have revealed the extent of
paramilitary infiltration within the State through alliances with politicians
and the support of certain private companies. The Supreme Court has
given clear evidence of its strength and independence, which reinforces the
possibility to further expose other paramilitary connections with members of
public and private institutions.
16. Despite these very
important cases, there remain serious structural problems for the efficacy of
the justice system, as mentioned before. The full introduction of the
accusatory system in the criminal courts, due to be completed by early 2008, is
intended to help combat impunity at all levels.
(b) Judicial proceedings under Law 975/2005, the “Justice
and Peace Law”
17. Law 975/2005 regulates the
procedures to be followed with demobilized members of illegal armed groups and
establishes judicial benefits based on their contribution to justice and
reparation. In 2007, 3,127 of the 31,671 demobilized paramilitaries were candidates for benefits
under Law 975/2005. As at 19 December 2007, the Attorney General´s Office had
begun the process of receiving 1,057 voluntary depositions; of these, 941
depositions were closed because the deponents did not ratify their willingness
to be processed according to Law 975/2005. A total of 542 candidates for
benefits are in prison. The Attorney General´s Office has also registered
121,547 victims. There is a marked contrast between the large number of cases
and the limited progress made – during 2007 not a single indictment was issued.
This shows the size of the Attorney General´s challenges, and supports many of
the concerns and doubts about the process.
18. Some of the victims and
some human rights defenders have pointed out that the information revealed by
the demobilized paramilitaries is often neither complete nor truthful. It is
evident, too, that the statements made by the majority of these paramilitaries
often attempt to justify – and even openly claim credit for – the acts
committed by their organizations. This leads to real risks to the lives and
safety of those victims who participate in proceedings. At the same time, the
flow of information that has come to light as a result of these depositions has
exposed the enormous dimensions of paramilitary criminal activity, and the unspeakable
details of events hitherto unknown to the authorities – let alone the public. These new disclosures
generate legitimate concern about the group of approximately 19,000 demobilized
paramilitaries who have not submitted to Law 975/2005 and have no formal
investigation open against them.
19. There is a growing
consensus regarding the need for new professional and technical resources for
the Attorney General´s Office, the Procurator General and the judicial system.
There must also be renewed national and international political support in
order to reinforce the judicial and political processes of the Justice and
Peace Law.
20. Another challenge lies in
the implementation of mechanisms to guarantee security for the victims to
participate and to receive reparations. This will have to be a central issue in
2008 if the Attorney General´s Office takes the steps that should follow the
depositions of the paramilitary leaders.
2.
Extrajudicial executions
21. The persistence of
extrajudicial executions attributed to members of the security forces,
especially members of the Army, has prompted the Government to strengthen the
control mechanisms. The political will of senior civilian and military
personnel to adopt measures which will prevent, investigate, punish and expose
situations in which this type of action has occurred has been most evident in
their discussions with the Office during 2007; and they acknowledge that
serious crimes, such as extrajudicial executions, do not even achieve any kind
of military advantage.
22. New directives produced
this year by senior Ministry of Defence officials and military authorities have emphasized technical
and regulatory matters. These directives could serve as the practical basis for
a comprehensive attempt to deal with allegations of extrajudicial executions
attributed to the security forces. The office in Colombia will closely and regularly
monitor implementation and results in 2008. All these measures follow the
orientation of several recommendations made by this office, and it is expected
that they will be fully developed in the document on integral policies of human
rights and international humanitarian law to be published by the Ministry of
Defence in early 2008. The Government has also asserted that the Military
Criminal Justice has a restrictive area of action and should be limited to
exceptional cases, as stated in the presidential objection to the bill
containing a new Military Criminal Code. Adjustments were also
made to adopt the accusatory system within the Military Criminal Justice. Other
Army measures included the deployment of operational legal advisers; the
strengthening of internal controls; the reinforcement of its human rights
offices; and training on the application of guidelines for personnel who are
the “primary responsible authority” to preserve evidence for the Attorney
General´s Office.
23. There is an abundance of
guidelines within the military, and an expanded policy of training in human
rights and international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, there is still much to
be done towards the effective implementation of these principles within the
security forces.
24. The office in Colombia continues
to receive complaints of extrajudicial executions attributed to the security
forces Some common characteristics of the complaints are the following: the
victims are represented as having being killed in combat; the scene of the
crime has been tampered with before the bodies were identified; and often
investigations have been initiated by the Military Criminal Justice system.
Official investigations reveal that the underlying motives in several of these
cases may be related to pressure on the military to show results, or to false
claims of success in action by certain members of the security forces to obtain
benefits and recognition.
25. The complaints also
indicate that the victims included some who might have been linked to new
illegal armed groups, such as in Toluviejo in June 2007, where six young men,
apparently recruited by unidentified persons, were found dead several days
later and were reported as having been killed in combat in Chinú, Córdoba, by
the Unified Action Group for Personal Liberty (GAULA) of Army Brigade 11.
26. It is urgent to identify
internal obstacles so that the policies described above can become fully
operative. There is also a need to make progress in the review, design and
implementation of new models of tactical training to be used at the level of
operative units, and to analyse lessons learned.
27. At the same time, OHCHR
welcomes the decision taken by the military leadership regarding the June 2007
incident in Balsillas, Caquetá, when two soldiers shot six people (including a
minor). The immediate reaction of the
military commanders was to send the case to the civilian jurisdiction, where
the soldiers were tried and sentenced in just three months.
28. If extrajudicial executions
are to be totally eradicated, the Attorney General´s Office and the control
agencies need to have greater commitment. The Attorney General´s Office has
created a special unit to conduct investigations of extrajudicial executions.
The complexity and dimensions of this problem require the allocation of
sufficient technical and budgetary resources, and appropriate training for the
investigation team.
3. Enforced disappearances
29. So far, the depositions by
demobilized paramilitary leaders have revealed the location of 1,009
clandestine graves within their respective zones of influence or control. This
has made it possible to recover the remains of 1,196 victims, most of whom have
not yet been identified (440 were reported as preliminary identified, and 118
fully identified bodies have been returned to the families). The process has certainly
revealed the way in which these extremely serious crimes were systematically
committed by paramilitary groups, and the widespread practice of enforced
disappearance in Colombia
in recent years.
30. It is urgent to redirect
the processes of exhumation so that many more bodies can be properly
identified. This will only happen if there is greater effort to facilitate the
participation of the victims’ families in the processes of investigation, in
line with international standards. Colombian and foreign forensic experts have
already made this recommendation to the authorities. The National Plan for the
Search of the Disappeared, issued in February 2007, favors collective and
regional investigations, thus facilitating the identification of patterns and
optimizing the efforts to identify the remains. But the Plan has barely gone
into operation. There have been positive experiences in the application of this
type of approach in Santa Marta, Magdalena, and Yopal, Casanare, which are worth
perfecting and extending to other regions, with the inclusion of guarantees for
the relatives.
4.
Torture and the excessive use of force
31. The office in Colombia
has received information on cases of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment and the excessive use of force by members of the security forces. In
Cesar, complaints have stated that in some extrajudicial executions attributed
to Army personnel, the victims had been tortured.
32. Likewise, the office in Colombia
received information on torture inflicted on soldiers by their superiors in
Bogotá, and it was also informed of cases of torture attributed to members of
the National Police in certain police stations or during patrols in Bogotá,
Huila and Norte de Santander. In the first of these cases, six officers in
Bogotá were removed from active service. The office in Colombia is also following up complaints on
excessive use of force by members of the Police Force’s Mobile Anti-Riot Squad
(ESMAD) in Chocó and Putumayo.
33. Cases
were reported of abuses allegedly committed by members of the police against
the transgender population engaged in prostitution in Bogotá, Medellin
and Cali.
5.
Illegal or arbitrary detentions
34. Complaints were made about
illegal or arbitrary detentions in which warrants were exclusively based on the
testimony of former guerrillas, which was not properly corroborated by other
evidence. In Cesar, 11 people were arrested and presented to the media as
guerrillas, and had to be released several days later for lack of proper
evidence. The same happened to another 12 detainees in Santander.
35. Some judicial decisions
have questioned the impartiality of witnesses, such as former guerrillas or
paramilitaries who receive economic benefits for their testimonies. This
happened in the case of a human rights defender in Santander who spent 14
months in prison on the basis of the testimony of two former guerrillas, and
was later acquitted when it was shown to be false.
6.
The situation in prisons
36. According to official data,
overcrowding in prisons has reached an average of 20.6 per cent, and the
situation is much worse in some establishments. The Government intends to build
11 new prisons during its remaining two and a half years of office. The current
situation requires additional efforts and measures to meet the basic needs of
prisoners, such as health, food, sanitation, legal advice and expert
assistance, and others such as family visits, education and work projects.
Steps already taken to implement an educational model and work training should
be extended to a greater number of inmates. The continuing need for
differential treatment of women prisoners, indigenous people, Afro-Colombians, lesbian,
gay, bisexual , and transgender persons (LGBTs) and AIDS sufferers within the
prison system is still a matter of concern.
37. The National Penitentiary
and Prison Institute (INPEC) has indicated that it will amend Law 65/1993
(Penitentiary Code) and reform the General Regulations for Penitentiaries and
Prisons, to respond to the above-mentioned issues.
38. Finally, Law 975/2005
implies new challenges in the design of a criminal policy. This refers
particularly to the security risks caused by the complex situations arising
when those formerly involved with paramilitary, guerilla and common criminal
groups are brought together in the same facility.
B. The demobilization processes
39. After the formal end of the
collective demobilization, the Casanare Rural Self-Defense Group is the only
remaining paramilitary group recognized during the negotiation process that is still operating. As per the information
directly collected by the office in Colombia, there is still concern that the
new illegal armed groups operating in the Departments of Meta, Vichada and
Guaviare, and there have been actions in Nariño attributed to the self-styled
Nueva Generación (“New Generation”), as was already mentioned in the High
Commissioner’s report of 2006 (E/CN.4/2006/9). These groups are heavily armed,
have a military organization and responsible leaders, and have the capacity to
control territory and to conduct military operations against other armed
actors. They represent an active factor in intensifying the armed conflict,
with direct and serious consequences for the civilian population. There has
been information suggesting that certain members of the armed forces have links
with actions attributed to these groups, or take an acquiescent or tolerant
attitude to them.
40. There are also serious
challenges to the consolidation of the demobilization process, precisely
because of the emergence of new illegal armed groups. The structures, interests
and modus operandi of these
groups are not homogeneous, and the use of identical terms to describe them
often conceals a wide variety of different activities, aims and alliances.
However, whatever their denomination, they remain a legitimate source of
concern because they continue to inflict violence on the civilian population, for example, in the
Departments of Chocó, Valle del Cauca, and Putumayo. The extensive use of the
name Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles) by
several of the existing groups, although they apparently do not belong to a
single structure, has created confusion and has occasionally enabled these
groups to divert attention from their real importance. For this reason, the
simple description of these new structures as “criminal gangs”, does not take
into account the complexity, variety and plurality of the phenomenon and the
danger it implies. Official figures report that the armed forces killed more
than three times as many members of such groups in 2007 as they did in 2006.
41. The authorities have
detected that former middle-ranking cadres from previous paramilitary groups
act as heads of some of these new groups, and that a number of low-level
demobilized members operate in areas which were once zones of influence of the
paramilitaries. Information received by the office in Colombia claims that these groups
maintain links with demobilized paramilitary leaders who have accepted the
terms of Law 975/2005. The Attorney General´s Office is investigating demobilized
paramilitary leaders accused of continuing with their criminal activities from
their cells in Itagui,
Antioquia.
42. Many of these groups have
been engaged exclusively in illegal activities which imply a control of
territory and of the population, such as drug-trafficking, extortion,
security-related actions, racketeering and other illegal activities. These have
often led to violent disputes among the criminals themselves. Their activity is
making a noticeable impact on the population in the form of murders, massacres, acts of
“social cleansing”, death threats and child
recruitment,
evidencing the need for ever greater efforts by the authorities to combat these
new groups and investigate their possible links with public servants and local
government officials. Likewise, the economic influence of these groups tends to
encourage corruption amongst authorities.
43. The Government considers
security and development to be central to sustainable reintegration of
demobilized persons, admittedly aware that the persistence of drug-trafficking
and other illegal activities facilitates the relapse of former combatants and
renews the capacity for recruitment of all illegal armed groups. The
Presidential Advisory Office for Reinsertion is implementing a number of
projects for the effective reintegration of the demobilized population.
However, it faces serious challenges in trying to secure greater participation
of regional and municipal authorities and the business sector to offer
alternative means of employment to the demobilized and guarantee their
security. This Office draws attention to the fact that many of the victims who
have not received reparations in the judicial proceedings under Law 975/2005
perceive the efforts described here as a form of “revictimization” that offends
their personal dignity and sense of justice.
C. Guerrilla groups
44. The FARC-EP continued to
disregard their duty to respect international humanitarian law. They have
committed grave and systematic breaches such as massacres, murders, the taking
of hostages, the planting of antipersonnel mines, acts of sexual violence,
recruitment of children (boys and girls) and terrorist acts. Among their many
crimes, members of this group were said to be responsible for two massacres in
May and August 2007 with 10 victims (among them a girl) perpetrated in Turbo,
Antioquia, as well as the murder of 11 Vall
